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1. Introduction 
The early stages of product development comprising idea generation designates a key part of the on-
going and successful design process [Cross 2001]. Idea generation often takes place in teams of people 
to ensure ideas are created and shared between different competences and perspectives on the task 
[Bucciarelli 2002]. Analysing the thinking and reasoning processes taking place in groups of designers 
during idea generation is therefore key to understanding and supporting design practice. 
 
In individuals, reasoning is an activity that decides how to respond to situations in every aspect of their 
lives. Reasoning consists of trains of thought, including deliberation, arguing and logical inferences, the 
basis of which relies on the mental model(s) held in a context [Johnson-Laird 2006]. Mental models held 
between people is termed team mental models explaining a shared team cognition about relevant 
knowledge and goals [Cannon-Bowers and Salas 2001]. The quality of team mental models are 
suggested to be indicative of team performance [Badke-Schaub et al. 2007]. A commonly used method 
for determining team performance in idea generation is through the evaluation of the outcome ideas 
[Kudrowitz and Wallace 2012]. 
 
Reasoning in design is argued to be largely unconscious, but also exists in a verbal, argumentative form 
[Rittel 1987]. In the context of design, Rittel states that “only at the micro-level can we identify patterns 
of reasoning corresponding to [the design process]”. Thus, the research presented in this paper seeks to 
develop a framework for empirically analysing patterns of reasoning as they are verbally realised 
between teams of people engaged in design activity. Specifically, the study aims to test the relationship 
between reasoning found in idea generation in groups and the effect on the quality of outcome ideas. 
 
First, the paper reviews and presents existing theories and models of formal reasoning and reasoning 
design, resulting in the formulation of study aims and hypotheses. Second, the paper presents the data 
collection and analysis method. Third, the paper presents and discusses the results of the data analysis 
including contributions to theory and practice and directions for further research. 
2. Theory and background 
The following sections draws upon existing theories and models, as well as relevant empirical studies 
concerning reasoning in design which provide the motivation for the framework for the study. 
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2.1. Formal logical reasoning and models of design 
When explaining design thinking, Rittel [1987] does not ascribe reasoning in design to a strictly formal 
character. However, recent contributions to reasoning in design define the activity from the perspective 
of formal logical reasoning. Therefore, the next section presents the formal types of reasoning and how 
they structure the thinking and reasoning of design. 
 
Since the works of C.S. Peirce, logical reasoning types have been formulated as being of either 
abductive, deductive or inductive types [March 1976]. The types of reasoning define three fundamental 
ways of drawing conclusions from premises. Abductive reasoning is a process of conjecture that yields 
the best explanation to a course of events. An abduction is the preliminary estimate that introduces 
plausible hypotheses and informs where to first enquire by choosing the best candidate among a 
multitude of possible explanations [Magnani 1995; Schurz 2007]. Deductive reasoning is tautological 
as it allows to arrive at a conclusion from the logical implication of two or more propositions asserted 
to be true [March 1976; Magnani 1995]. Consequently, deduction is heavily justificational because the 
premises guarantees the truth of a conclusion [Schurz 2007]. Inductive reasoning is the process of 
deriving plausible conclusions that go beyond information in the premises [Johnson-Laird 2006]. 
Inductive reasoning is tautological like deductive reasoning because it infers concepts only from 
available data within a model or frame of reference [Schurz 2007; Magnani 1995].  
 
Together, the reasoning types enter into three-stage process of inquiry [Fann 1970]. This process of 
inquiry is argued to be domain-dependent [March 1976]. Formal models of reasoning guide several 
studies of reasoning in design is existing literature. The formal models define design activity as an 
abductive process as it is the only type of reasoning able to suggest new concepts [Roozenburg 1993; 
Dorst 2011]. While above models of design are not empirically tested, a similar study by Dong et al 
[2015] analysed verbal protocols of reasoning processes between participants evaluating design ideas 
and concepts in terms of the formal deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning types and found that 
all three types of reasoning occur during design concept evaluation. Further, they find that abductive 
reasoning in evaluating ideas lead to fewer rejected ideas and deductive reasoning lead to more rejected 
ideas.  
 
Problem solving theories and models of design emphasise that design thinking concerns (a) the notion 
something novel and useful which is (b) concretised and explored and (c) evaluated to amend the original 
notion or concept [Gero and Kannengiesser 2004; March 1976]. From the field of cognitive psychology, 
Johnson-Laird [2006:353] describes a generic problem solving cycle as the “…use [of] some constraints 
to generate a putative solution, and other constraints, such as the goal of the problem, to criticise and 
amend the results". Christensen and Schunn [2009] studied the role of mental simulations in design from 
protocols of concurrent verbalisation of design teams. The study found mental simulation, interpreted 
here as a primarily deductive reasoning process, to reduce uncertainty of a frame into approximate 
answers, hence suggesting that deduction is an integral part of reasoning in design activity.  
 
Schön [1983] offers a different perspective of how to perceive the design process as a practice involving 
naming, framing, moving and reflecting in cycle converging towards problem understanding and 
moving towards a solution. Framing guides action by providing a way for individuals and teams alike 
to ‘see’ and shape design activity. An empirical study using the framework of Schön by Valkenburg and 
Dorst [1998] using protocol analysis found that the integration of solutions at different levels of 
complexity using framing is central to good performance finding empirical evidence for the importance 
of framing. 
 
The study presented here combines the above theories and models to interpret reasoning in design as a 
three-stage process. The process involves; (1) reasoning that leads to a problem setting or perception 
through framing, followed by (2) reasoning that concretises and predicts a solution or effect under the 
framing, and finally (3) a reasoning process that evaluates by reference to principles or accepted facts, 
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possibly 'outside' the frame. The process is not necessarily linear, but involve iterations at different levels 
of abstraction depending on the framing [Voss 2006].  
2.2. Reasoning is argumentative 
Addressing design activity directly, Rittel [1987] argues that there is no clear separation between 
problem definition, synthesis and evaluation. Rittel consequently goes on to define reasoning in design 
as a process of argumentation. Whether working alone or in groups, design involves issues and 
competing positions that are interconnected and ‘open’ simultaneously. When engaged in a verbal 
discourse, these divergent perspectives can appear as speculation, argumentation, trade-offs or 
negotiation [Bucciarelli 2002; Rittel 1987].  
 
Taking the definition of reasoning in design as a process of argumentation at face value, the research 
field of argumentation theory and rhetoric offers useful models and theories to explain reasoning in 
teams of designers. Argumentation theory argues for argumentation as an integral part of reasoning 
[Mercier and Sperber 2011]. Thus, analysing conversation between groups of people engaged in design 
holds the potential to understand and explain verbal reasoning as the deployment of linguistic processes 
to satisfy the demands of a cognitive reasoning task [Polk and Newell 1995]. Such attempts at verbal 
reasoning derive their persuasiveness from their similarity to the formal types of reasoning [Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969]. Verbal reasoning is therefore not identical to the reasoning types of 
deductive, inductive or abductive in the formal logical sense, but the characteristics of utterances have 
similarities to the reasoning types in their verbal deployment. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca go on to 
express that the “choice of terms to express the speaker’s thought is rarely without significance to the 
argumentation” [ibid.:149]. In a study of argumentation and rhetoric in design activity, Stumpf and 
McDonell [2002] argue that premises in design discourse draw on both existing understandings (facts) 
and on values. This process of argumentation creates frames that persuades and changes the perceptions 
and perspectives of all involved in a conversation. Hence, the study understands the reasoning in groups 
as an argumentative process in which the framing influences design outcomes. Hence, the first use of 
reasoning to propose an idea, the framing, is decisive of the idea evaluation. This is backed by the finding 
of Stumpf and McDonnell [2002] that framing potentially persuades and changes the perceptions and 
perspectives of those involved in a conversation. Likewise, the notion of primary generator underlying 
ideas supports that idea starts are important to the perception of said idea [Darke 1979]. 
2.3. Idea evaluation 
Approaches to evaluate the quality of ideas have similarities across literature, for example usefulness 
(value to user), feasibility and novelty [Amabile 1996; Kudrowitz and Wallace 2012]. These 
contributions have in common that the evaluation of creative or innovative ideas is through a 
combination of these factors and have often been applied when students are the participants of the study. 
In contrast, the present study, with participants and design problems from industry, applies a method for 
evaluating ideas that categorises ideas according how to valuable and useful they are within the context 
of the on-going development project. Thus, the evaluation focuses on a consensual rating of each idea 
according to practicality of meeting the needs at hand [Keshwani et al, 2013; Ward and Kolomyts, 2010]. 
This result in an evaluation system consisting of four idea categories that favour ideas that are 
implementable within the development projects in the companies. The evaluation categories of ‘Accept’, 
‘Analyse’, ‘Put on hold’ and ‘Reject’, define the fitness of an idea according to the value the idea brings 
to the project in a timeframe of months, the categories are described in detail later in the paper. 
3. Empirically analysing reasoning effects on idea value 
Departing from the intention to understand the patterns of reasoning in design, the study aims to 
complete an analysis of utterances that resemble the three types of logical reasoning in their syntactical 
form. The study investigates how utterances that can be categorised within these reasoning types appear 
in a context of argumentative dialogue between groups engaging in design activity. As presented in the 
above, the argumentative form of verbal utterances entails that assumptions, values and other biases are 
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part of the utterances. To analyse the effects of patterns of argumentation and reasoning on design 
activity, the study further uses the outcome idea value to the design process as an indicator. 
3.1. Hypotheses 
The study formulates two hypotheses to test the relationship between reasoning and idea value. 
 
H1: Ideas evaluated as ‘Accept’ are more likely to be started by deductive than abductive utterances. 
As reported earlier, a study of reasoning in design found that abductive reasoning during evaluation 
leads to a higher degree of acceptance [Dong et al. 2015]. H2 assumes an opposite direction because of 
the criteria set for evaluating ideas. The case in Dong et al describes the evaluation of ideas for an 
innovation context, while the evaluation criteria in the present study of 'accept' favours incremental 
ideas, i.e. those that can be implemented within the time frame and resources of the development project. 
Thus, ideas started a certain, deductive form are perceived to be implementable and consequently 
accepted.  
 
H2: Ideas evaluated as ‘Put on hold’ are more likely started by abductive than deductive utterances.  
A previous study using the same coding scheme found indications that conditions fostering abductive 
reasoning lead to more ideas evaluated as ‘Put on hold’ [Cramer-Petersen and Ahmed-Kristensen 2015]. 
Therefore, H1 assumes that abductive reasoning leads to ideas that suggest value to the project but in an 
uncertain way requiring further investigation, and thus evaluated unfit for current development project, 
but potentially valuable for future projects, i.e. radical innovation rather than incremental. 
4. Method 
This section describes the data collection source and methods and presents the coding scheme used to 
analyse the data. 
4.1. Data collection 
Idea generation and evaluation workshops in four companies providing the data for this study. All 
companies were involved in a product development project, were an SME in size, and the idea 
generation and evaluation took place in a workshop with company participants from several departments 
working on real world problems. For all companies there was a project milestone for completed concept 
prototypes within six months of the idea generation workshops. Table 1 summarises company details. 
Table 1: Details on companies used for data collection 
Company and 
product type 
Number of 
employees 
Participant roles in company Team 
size 
1. Construction 
tools 
~10 Project manager, design engineer (2), industrial designer 4 
2. Waste 
management 
equipment 
~80 Head of development, design engineer (2), production manager, 
purchasing manager, mechanical engineering consultant (2), 
sales manager 
8 
3. Food 
refrigeration 
~200 Technical support manager, design engineer (2), production 
manager, production/assembly (2), production planning, R&D 
manager, product manager 
9 
4. Agricultural 
machinery 
~350 Project coordinator, design engineer (2), purchasing (2), 
technical assistant, workshop manager, marketing manager, 
production/assembly, technical development manager 
10 
 
The workshops were audio and video recorded, and facilitated to allow the participants to generate 
many, quick ideas documented on post-its as keywords and/or sketches. Brief verbal presentations to 
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other participants accompanied all ideas. The workshop consisted of 3-5 rounds of idea generation, for 
total durations between 90-120 minutes, with focus on (a) ‘open’ brainstorm, (b) cost reduction and (c) 
user and improved functionality. 
 
A smaller group of the participants from each of the workshops held for the four case companies 
evaluated the ideas generated from this idea generation workshop immediately after idea generation was 
completed. These groups counted at least the project leader and one design engineer for all companies. 
The evaluating groups used two matrices to determine the value of the ideas. The first matrix evaluated 
a high/low fit to project and a high/low value to user. Ideas scoring low on value to user went into the 
‘Reject’ category. Ideas scoring high on value to user but low on fit to project were put into the ‘Put on 
hold’ category. Ideas scoring high on both value to user and fit to project, moved to the second matrix 
for further evaluation. The second matrix evaluated ideas according to high/low fit to company portfolio 
and strategy, and low/high to the risk and resource investment required. Ideas scoring high on fit to 
company portfolio and strategy and low (positive) on risk and resource investment required went into 
the ‘Accept’ category. Ideas scoring high on fit to company portfolio and strategy, and high to the risk 
and resource investment required, and vice versa, went into the ‘Analyse’ category. 
4.2. Data analysis 
Data was analysed using protocol analyses of concurrent verbalisation. Protocol analysis of design 
activity is a way to understand underlying cognitive processes, e.g. reasoning, with minimal interruption 
of the recorded process [Ericsson and Simon, 1993; Christensen, 2009]. Consequently, verbal protocol 
analyses of real life industrial development projects is relevant and expected to be highly representative 
of design cognition found in practice [Ahmed et al., 2003; Chi, 1997; Christensen, 2009]. In this case, 
as the observations were in groups, no additional verbalisation were required, hence there is a minimum 
of interference with thought processes. 
 
The transcripts of the idea generation workshops resulted in the protocols. To break these down into 
segments, segmentation was completed according to word phrases [Goldschmidt 1991]. Next, a two-
step coding scheme was used to analyse the segmented protocols. The coding scheme is summarised in 
table 2 and described in detail in the following sections. 
Table 2: Coding names and steps used to code protocols  
Coding step 1 – identifying ideas 2 – classifying reasoning 
Code list IDEA ABDUCTION 
IDEA ASPECT DEDUCION 
 INDUCTION 
 
First coding of the protocols involved the coding for presence of idea and idea aspect. Design activity 
in groups result in ideas that are contributed to by more than one person [Badke-schaub et al. 2007; Voss 
2006]. Hence, ideas form idea episodes consisting of both a first mention of the idea (coded idea) and 
follow up utterances related to the same idea (coded idea aspect). Henceforth, idea episodes denote 
segments that include related idea and idea aspect utterances. 
 
Definitions of the three types of reasoning, abductive, deductive and inductive, were derived from the 
literature review [Fann 1970; Johnson-Laird 2006; Magnani 1995; March 1976; Reichertz 2014; 
Roozenburg 1993; Schurz 2007]. The definitions used were oriented towards the suggested role or 
function that the three types of reasoning serve in reasoning processes. Generally, the codes interpreted 
the reasoning types as: (a) Abductive reasoning conveys uncertainty and possibility, (b) deductive 
reasoning conveys certainty and definitiveness and (c) inductive reasoning conveys preference through 
evaluation or generalisation. The coding of reasoning types was restricted to the idea episodes coded in 
the first step of the coding process. 
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Cohen’s weighted Kappa was calculated  for inter coder reliability after each of the coding steps [Cohen 
1968]. The first author coded the all protocols, while the second author coded 460 segments for idea and 
idea aspect, reaching a Kappa of 0.71, and 353 segments for reasoning, reaching a Kappa of 0.61. Both 
scores are good and justify the validity of the coding scheme. 
5. Results 
This section presents and discusses the results of the data analysis. In addition to the quantitative 
analyses of the data to test the hypotheses, the section presents a qualitative analysis using examples and 
observations from the protocols to interpret and discuss the results. 
5.1. Quantitative analysis 
The protocols counted 6518 segments of which 3866 segments were idea episodes (59%). Of the idea 
episodes, 3354 segments (87%) coded for reasoning. Table 3 below presents the proportional 
distribution of all reasoning codes. The table also presents the proportional distribution of the type of 
reasoning first appearing (reasoning start) in idea episodes. 
Table 3: Total counts and proportions of reasoning types and reasoning to start idea episodes 
   Abductive Deductive Inductive 
Coded reasoning Count 435 2472 447 
Proportion 13% 74% 13% 
Reasoning start Count 125 227 18 
Proportion 33% 63% 4% 
 
The coding found a high proportion of deductive reasoning and even amounts of abductive and inductive 
reasoning. However, when analysing the reasoning that starts idea episodes a higher proportion of 
abductive reasoning (33%) and lower proportions of deductive (63%) and inductive reasoning (4%) 
compared to overall reasoning proportions was found. 
 
The workshops generated 349 evaluated ideas. Of these, 291 (83%) had an identifiable idea episode in 
the protocols, others were simply stated. Table 4 presents the distribution of the 291 ideas suitable for 
testing the hypotheses. 
Table 4: Total counts and proportions of idea evaluation 
Idea evaluation Accept Analyse Put on hold Reject 
Count 168 39 40 44 
Proportion 58% 13% 14% 15% 
 
Ideas accepted for further use accounted for more than half of all ideas, while ideas not accepted evenly 
distributed across the other three categories.  
 
To test the two hypotheses, a one-way ANOVA analysis was completed for the effect of reasoning start 
on idea evaluation, yielding (F(2, 288) = 6.308, p = 0.002). Hence, there is significant dependency of 
reasoning start on idea evaluation. The relationship is further analysed using independent samples t-tests 
to complete a pairwise comparison for the proportional differences across. Figure 1 below also displays 
the calculated confidence intervals (to the 95% margin of error) of the proportional distributions, thus 
illustrating the actual differences between the reasoning types hypothesised to start ‘Accept’ and ‘Put 
on hold’ idea evaluations. 
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Figure 1: Proportional differences in reasoning type to start idea episodes by evaluation 
category. Numbers above each bar indicate number of ideas 
 
The analysis significantly supports both H1 and H2. First, H1 hypothesised that deductive reasoning 
start ideas would be more likely to be accepted than those started by abductive reasoning. The paired 
bars to the left in figure 1 shows that 68% of deductive vs. 40% of abductive started ideas are accepted. 
This result is significant as shown by the p-value of the t-test (p=0.000). Second, H2 hypothesised that 
abductive reasoning is more likely to start ‘Put on hold’ ideas than deductive reasoning. The paired bars 
third from left in figure 1 shows that 25% of abductive vs. 7% of deductive ideas are ‘put on hold’. This 
result is significant as shown by the p-value of the t-test (p=0.000). 
5.2. Observations and interpretations 
In the following section, an example and observations from the data interpret the above results. First, 
table 5 presents an example idea episode. Next, the episode is analysed and interpreted along with 
general observations from the protocols. 
Table 5:  Example idea episode from protocols. Translated from to English from Danish 
Speaker Segment IDEA IDEA 
ASPECT 
REASONING  
TYPE 
A if you could minimise the entire pulley x  ABDUCTION 
A or then just have a reel or a caster x  ABDUCTION 
A that you find on the American solutions, x  DEDUCTION 
A but then you just do a pre… x  DEDUCTION 
A use a bit more to prepare x  DEDUCTION 
A so you drive it to the window,  x  DEDUCTION 
A in the right distance mount it x  DEDUCTION 
A and then you just have to lift it 3-4 cm x  DEDUCTION 
A and then you have the adjustment and lift it again x  DEDUCTION 
A so you minimise the entire phase of pulling and 
lifting 
x  DEDUCTION 
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A so you just do it manually x  DEDUCTION 
B It could also be that you used the pulley to drive 
the wheel, 
 x ABDUCTION 
B so you extend it and attach the hook  x DEDUCTION 
B oh wait no, but, well…  x  
B it is silly as it is now  x INDUCTION 
B but it could be with the same motor  x DEDUCTION 
B when it is attached to the cart base  x DEDUCTION 
B then there is some sort of gearing to the wheel,  x DEDUCTION 
B same engine drives and pulls…  x DEDUCTION 
 
The idea presented in the above example shows how abductive reasoning frames the idea by proposing 
to minimise or remove a product component. Following this is a range of deductive utterances seeking 
to explore possible solutions to the framing. After that, a second person contributes to the idea, thus 
triggering an aspect of the idea and abductive reasoning by re-framing the solution by suggesting 
alternative uses for the component sought minimised or removed in the previous framing. An instance 
of inductive reasoning also occurs as a subjective attitude to an existing solution. Investigating the form 
of the argument in the exemplified idea episode and drawing on the analysis of multiple episodes in the 
protocols, six observations stand out. First, abductive reasoning conveys possibility and intention in an 
uncertain form that invites to exploration of what it proposes. Second, and in contrast to abduction, 
deduction reasoning conveys certainty in a definitive form. This form often occurs when producing a 
sequence of statements that simulate a solution or consequence, as shown in above example. Third, 
inductive reasoning generally occurs at later in idea episodes and takes a form of decision or subjective 
attitude towards the idea. Fourth, reasoning types occur in different sequences, and thus do not follow a 
strict abductive-deductive-inductive process of inquiry as suggested by prescriptive models of design 
[March 1976]. Fifth, all types of reasoning can start idea episodes. While abductive reasoning is more 
likely to start episodes rather than appear in them (33% vs. 13%, refer to table 3), a majority of ideas 
(63%) are started by deductive reasoning. Different to the example above, ideas started by deductive 
reasoning often takes the form of an existing solution mentioned in a certain way, leaving little room for 
questioning or discussing the appropriateness of the idea. Sixth, the analysis shows that only 2% of all 
idea episodes did not include deductive reasoning, underlining the importance of deductions as a means 
to propose and simulate solutions, which is central to progress the design process [March 1976; 
Christensen and Schunn 2009]. 
 
A significant relationship exists between the type of reasoning used to start ideas and the resulting 
evaluation. Additionally, observing of the idea evaluation system in use by the companies revealed that 
accepted ideas tended to rely on existing solutions while ideas categorised to be ‘put on hold’ tended to 
entail the generation of radically new functional principles. Therefore, the study shows a link between 
the innovativeness of evaluated ideas, given the interpreted forms and function of the reasoning types 
in the data, inferring that accepted ideas are more likely to be incremental and generated with a reasoning 
process beginning with deduction while ‘put on hold’ ideas are more likely to be radical and likely to 
be started with an abductive reasoning process. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
First, supported by both hypotheses, we find that there is a significant relationship between how ideas 
start and how they later add value to the design process. This result shows the importance of how people 
argue for their ideas, as it is a factor that influences framing and consequently other people in a context 
of group idea generation. The result thus agree with similar studies [Valkenburg and Dorst 1998; Stumpf 
and McDonnell 2002; Darke 1979]. 
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Second, from the result of H1 that deductive reasoning leads to more incremental ideas, we argue that 
the definitive form of deductive reasoning constrains the remaining reasoning sequence to be less ‘open’ 
to redefine the initial framing. We attribute this with the certain and definitive form of deductive 
reasoning [Fann 1970]. This is evident because deductive reasoning starts idea episodes 63% of the time 
and that 58% of ‘Accept’ ideas do not contain any abductive reasoning while the number is 8% for ‘Put 
on hold’ ideas, 29% for Analyse ideas and given the evaluation system favouring the acceptance of 
incremental ideas. In contrast with  the result from H2, abductive reasoning leads to more radical ideas, 
we argue that the uncertain and ‘open’ form of abductive reasoning leads to a higher likelihood of more 
abductive reasoning appearing in the development of the idea, entailing new perspectives and ways of 
‘seeing’ the problem, signifying more radically different ideas [Roozenburg 1993]. Hence, ideas started 
by deductive reasoning risk missing out on alternative solutions and ideas started by abductive reasoning 
risk having less change of being accepted due to ideas unfit for the constraints set by e.g. a product 
development project. Therefore, the study finds that analysing the form of verbal reasoning present is a 
way to diagnose whether an idea generation workshop, or similar design activity, is progressing in a 
productive way by producing appropriate and valuable ideas [Kudrowitz and Wallace 2012]. 
 
Third, owing to other factors that influence how ideas are evaluated, we propose that analysing the form 
verbal reasoning is combined with other methods for understanding design activity. Another important 
factor to consider is the content of utterances, i.e. what an utterance proposes. While the present study 
has mainly investigated the form of arguments made, other studies in design concern analysing and 
modelling how ‘design’ ideas develop, e.g. concerning function, behaviour and structure [Gero and 
Kannengiesser 2004; March 1976]. Thus, integrating such analyses with the analysis method applied in 
present study holds potential to understand reasoning in design progresses along with the co-evolution 
of problem and solution [Dorst and Cross 2001]. 
6.2. Contributions and future research 
Concluding, the study presented the analysis of reasoning in groups for both generation of ideas and 
their evaluation on four real world problems.  
Main contributions include: (a) The development of a reliable coding scheme for identifying verbal 
reasoning, (b) showing a significant relationship between reasoning to start ideas and the evaluated value 
of the idea and (c) demonstrating that verbal framing is decisive for the further development of an idea 
in terms of how existing perspectives on problems and solutions change. Combined, the contributions 
contribution to the understanding of design as a complex activity involving technical and social 
considerations, and provide a platform for further research on: 
• The identification and analysis of other factors influencing verbal reasoning and idea value 
alike, e.g. the content of reasoning in idea generation 
• Analysing individual differences in reasoning to support team composition and performance 
From the perspective of design practice, the study has shown the importance of verbal reasoning as a 
tangible aspect of design activity. By being aware of the verbal form used when proposing ideas 
practitioners can influence others to accept ideas or to emphasise new perspective, etc. This is a point 
of further research through the development and testing of: 
• Tools for diagnosing design activity in practice 
• Design methods or similar to influence the verbal reasoning of design teams 
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